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Abstract
Regularizing the input gradient has shown to be
effective in promoting the robustness of neural net-
works. The regularization of the input’s Hessian is
therefore a natural next step. A key challenge here
is the computational complexity. Computing the
Hessian of inputs is computationally infeasible.
In this paper we propose an efficient algorithm to
train deep neural networks with Hessian operator-
norm regularization. We analyze the approach
theoretically and prove that the Hessian operator
norm relates to the ability of a neural network to
withstand an adversarial attack. We give a prelim-
inary experimental evaluation on the MNIST and
FMNIST datasets, which demonstrates that the
new regularizer can, indeed, be feasible and, fur-
thermore, that it increases the robustness of neural
networks over input gradient regularization.
1. Introduction
Allowing for the automation of many previously impossible
tasks, deep learning has brought about tremendous advances
in machine learning. However, the lack of robustness of
deep neural networks (DNNs) has caused some concern
regarding their deployment, particularly in security or safety-
critical applications. One such concern is the existence of
adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013)—samples that
have been imperceptibly modified to trick a deep learning
system to behave incorrectly. Many methods have been
proposed to generate such examples (Carlini & Wagner,
2017; Kurakin et al., 2016; Athalye et al., 2018; Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2015) or defend neural networks against
them (Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017; Singla & Feizi, 2020;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019; Madry et al., 2017).
A line of research suggests that the regularization of input
gradients helps promote robustness (Finlay & Oberman,
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2019; Ross & Doshi-Velez, 2018; Hein & Andriushchenko,
2017). To better theoretically understand the robustness
of neural networks against adversarial attacks, Hein & An-
driushchenko (2017) introduced a theoretical bound on the
robustness of a network in terms of the norm of its gradient
around a test sample. A large (input) gradient at a sample
implies that it is possible to change the network output by
only slightly manipulating the input. Using this theoretical
insight, they propose a defense in the form of a regular-
izer that promotes the model’s gradient norms to be small.
Their regularizer assumes that the network is locally well-
approximated by a linear function. This approximation can
be poor when a function is highly non-linear, as it is the
case with neural networks. Second-order approximations
can be more suitable here and improve robustness. This was
empirically supported in Fawzi et al. (2017), where the au-
thors showed that adversarial directions can highly correlate
with high principal curvatures (i.e., Hessian eigenvectors
that correspond to high eigenvalues).
In this paper we propose to use second-order derivatives to
better approximate the behavior of the classifier around a
sample. We prove guarantees in the form of lower bounds
on the robustness of neural networks in terms of second-
order derivatives. Motivated by our theoretical results, we
propose Cross-Ho¨lder Regularization, a second order regu-
larizer that penalizes input Hessians with large eigenvalues.
While a naive approach to computing the gradient of the
largest absolute eigenvalue of a Hessian is computationally
expensive, we introduce an efficient procedure to compute
it. We present a preliminary empirical evaluation on the
MNIST and FMNIST datasets, which showcases that our
method can outperform gradient-based regularization on
robustness to adversarial samples.
The paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this
section we introduce the notation. In Section 2 we introduce
a new theory that relates adversarial robustness to second-
order differential properties of neural networks. In Section
3 we introduce a new regularizer as well as a method for
computing the gradient of the operator norm of a Hessian.
Finally in Section 5 we present an empirical analysis. Note
that related work is discussed in Appendix A.
Notation and Problem Setup Let X ⊂ Rd be a feature
space and Y = {1, . . . ,K} a label space. Denote the train-
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Input Hessian Regularization of Neural Networks
ing set by {(xi, yi)}Ni=1. We are interested in classifiers that
are derived from a scoring function f : X → RK from
which we classify via Cf (x) := arg maxi fi(x). Train-
ing is therefore achieved by selecting a scoring function
from a family of functions F indexed by real-valued pa-
rameters θ ∈ RD, with the goal to minimize the objec-
tive ΣNi=1`(fθ(xi), yi), where ` : RK × Y → R+ is a
loss function. For the rest of the paper we use f(x) in-
stead of fθ(x) to avoid notational clutter. For a matrix
H ∈ Rd×d, the operator norm ‖H‖p→q is defined as:
‖H‖p→q := sup{‖Hx‖q : ‖x‖p = 1}. Our goal is to
train classifiers that are robust under adversarial attacks.
That is, if a classifier Cf predicts a class for an input x, it
should stay consistent for similar examples x′. Formally,
for a robustness level  > 0, we require Cf (x) = Cf (x+ δ),
for ‖δ‖p ≤ .
2. Robustness and Second Order Derivatives
In this section, we prove a theoretical result that relates
the robustness of a classifier to the input Hessian opera-
tor norm. Our first result is akin to Theorem 1 in Hein &
Andriushchenko (2017), where the authors proved that ro-
bustness is controlled by the norm input gradient of a margin
loss in a local `p ball around it. We extend their theory to
control the robustness of classifier by the Hessian operator
norm in an `p ball around an input example. Therefore,
we show an explicit connection between the robustness and
curvature. This connection allows us to derive our second
order regularizer. To avoid notational clutter, we present
our result for the binary classifier case. First we review the
result by Hein & Andriushchenko (2017).
Theorem 1. Let x ∈ Rd and f : Rd → R2 be a binary-
classifier scoring function with continuously differentiable
components. Further let f0(x) > f1(x) and define f =
f0 − f1. For δ ∈ Rd and p, q such that 1p + 1q = 1, if
f1(x+ δ) ≥ f0(x+ δ), then the following bound holds
‖δ‖p ≥ max
R>0
min
{
R,
f(x)
max‖γ‖p≤R ‖∇f(x+ γ)‖q
}
.
(1)
The above bound implies that, if f is not steep around x
(i.e. ∇f(δ + x) is small), then one must move a large
distance away from x to find an adversarial example (i.e.
δ is large). This bound was shown to be tight in Hein &
Andriushchenko (2017) when considering linear classifiers.
Note here that the dependence on curvature is only
implicit. Indeed, if f is locally highly curved, then
max‖γ‖p≤R ‖∇f(x+γ)‖q is large. In order to design a cur-
vature regularizer, we introduce the following result which
makes the dependence on the curvature explicit.
Theorem 2. Let x ∈ Rd and f : Rd → R2 be a binary-
classifier scoring function with continuously twice differ-
entiable components. Further let f0(x) > f1(x) and de-
fine f = f0 − f1. Hf : Rd → Rd×d denotes the Hes-
sian of f . For δ ∈ Rd and p, q such that 1p + 1q = 1, if
f1(x+ δ) ≥ f0(x+ δ), then the following bound holds:
‖δ‖p ≥ max
R>0
min
{
R,
f(x)
‖∇f(x)‖q + R2KR(f, x)
}
, (2)
where KR(f, x) = max‖γ‖p≤RK(f, x + γ), for
K(f, x) := ‖Hf (x)‖p→q .
The proof of the above theorem is deferred to Appendix B.
The theorem suggests that, to control the robustness of a
classifier, we must control the local curvature around input
points. Again, this requirement is on f , not the individual
components fi. Therefore, the classifier components can
have a large local curvature as far as the relative curvature
is low, which is a less strict requirement. The dependence
on the curvature is explicit in this result through the input
Hessian operator norm of the margin function f locally
around the input point. Since this bound is equivalent to the
bound (1) in the case of linear scoring functions, it borrows
its tightness.
In the next corollary, we extend our result to a multi-class
classifier. It is straightforward to do so. If a classifier pre-
dicts a class t, then define f (j) = ft − fj . We then apply
theorem 2 to f (j), for j 6= t, and take the minimum of
resulting lower bounds.
Corollary 1. Let x ∈ Rd and f : Rd → RK be a multi-
class classifier scoring function with continuously twice
differentiable components. Further let t = arg maxi fi(x)
and define f (j) = ft − fj for j 6= t. For δ ∈ Rd and p, q
such that 1p +
1
q = 1, if maxj 6=t fj(x+ δ) > ft(x+ δ), then
‖δ‖p is bounded below by:
max
R>0
min
{
R,min
j 6=t
f (j)(x)
‖∇f (j)(x)‖q + R2KR(f (j), x)
}
.
(3)
3. Cross Ho¨lder Regularizer
In this section, we introduce a new technique for adversarial
defending. The goal is to define a regularizer that improves
the robustness of multi-class classifiers. This regularizer is
based on (3) introduced in the last section. We start by de-
riving the regularization term to maximize the lower bound.
Directly doing so is computationally impractical. Therefore,
we reformulate it, to make it amenable for training.
Our goal is to train a classifier so that for an adversarial
example, x+ δ, the norm of δ must be large, i.e. adversarial
examples must have a large amount of distortion. To that
end, we train our classifier in such a way that the right-hand
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side of (3) is large at test samples. It suffices to maximize
the term for each j independently, that is,
max
θ
f (j)(x)∥∥∇f (j)(x)∥∥
q
+ R2KR(f, x)
. (4)
It was argued in Hein & Andriushchenko (2017) that the
cross entropy loss will naturally drive f (j)(x) to be large.
Therefore we turn our attention to the denominator of
(4). Minimizing the gradient term is standard (Drucker
& Le Cun, 1992; Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017; Ross &
Doshi-Velez, 2018). The Hessian term is, however, hard
to minimize. The first issue is the maximization operator
max‖γ‖p≤R, which makes evaluation of this term computa-
tionally expensive. To alleviate this issue, we assume that
‖Hf(j)(x)‖p→q ≈ max‖γ‖p≤R ‖Hf(j)(x + γ)‖p→q. This
can be achieved if we assume that the function f is locally
well-approximated by a quadratic function.
Our final objective is thus to make
∥∥∇f (j)(x)∥∥
q
+
R
2 ‖Hf(j)(x)‖p→q small for all j 6= y, where we now treat
R as a tuning parameter. Relaxing this regularizer a bit and
taking a summation of all possible classes we arrive at our
proposed training objective, where we enforce our network
to be robust around training samples. We define our loss
L ({xi, yi}ni=1) to be
n∑
i=1
`(yi, xi)+
λ1
n∑
i=1
K∑
j=1,j 6=yi
(
‖∇f (j)(xi)‖q + λ2K(f (j), xi)
)
,
(5)
where `(., .) is the cross-entropy loss, and λ1 and λ2 are
regularization parameters. The last two terms of (5) together
form the Cross-Ho¨lder Regularizer. Notice that when λ2 =
0 we get the Cross-Lipschitz regularizer.
4. Training with Hessian Operator norm
To minimize the new objective (5), we will use stochastic
gradient descent. Thus we need to evaluate the gradient of
the objective. Obtaining the gradients needed for SGD is
usually done through automatic differentiation (Griewank &
Walther, 2008), as implemented in popular machine learn-
ing toolkits (e.g., Tensorflow (Abadi et al., 2016)). It is
sufficiently efficient to compute the gradient of the loss and
gradient norm. Computing the gradient of the operator norm
of the Hessian is, however, very computationally inefficient
for algorithmic differentiation. Obtaining the Hessian is
very costly for large neural network architectures, let alone
computing its operator norm and computing the gradient of
the combined operations with respect to the model parame-
ters.
We now describe how to efficiently calculate the gradient of
the Hessian operator norm. In what follows we use Hθ to
denote Hf(j)(x). Define a function g : Rd ×RD → R+ as
g(θ, v) = ‖Hθv‖q, (6)
where θ is the model parameters and v ∈ {v ∈ Rd : ‖v‖p =
1}. Therefore, the operator norm is
‖Hθ‖p→q = max‖v‖p=1 g(θ, v).
Let v∗ be the vector attaining the maximum of (6). If v∗ is
a unique maximizer, then, by Danskin’s theorem (Danskin,
2012), we have
∇θ max‖v‖p=1 g(θ, v) = ∇θg(θ, v
∗).
It was also shown in Madry et al. (2017) that, even if v∗ is
not a unique maximum, the direction −∇θg(θ, v∗) is still
a descent direction. Therefore it suffices to compute the
gradient at the maximum v∗ for training.
There still remains the problem of computing both v∗ and
∇θ‖Hθv∗‖q . One can find v∗ by optimizing (6). It is, how-
ever, again the problem of computing the Hessian matrixHθ.
Fortunately, the Hessian matrix appears above only multi-
plied by a vector. This allows us to use an efficient algorithm
to obtain a computational graph for Hessian vector multi-
plication (Pearlmutter, 1994). With this algorithm one can
use algorithmic differentiation to obtain both∇θ‖Hθv∗‖q
and ∇v‖Hθv‖q1 with a computational expense on the same
order as backpropagation (Griewank & Walther, 2008; Pearl-
mutter, 1994). In a nutshell, our approach reduces to solving
min
θ
max
vij
n∑
i=1
`(yi, xi)+
λ1
n∑
i=1
K∑
j 6=yi
(
‖∇f (j)(xi)‖q + λ2‖Hf(j)(xi)vij‖q
)
,
for ‖vij‖p = 1. Algorithm 4 summarizes our training ap-
proach. The inner loop is used to estimate v∗ which is then
used in the last step to estimate the gradient of the objective.
In our experiments, we found setting T = 10 and o = 0.1
in the algorithm suffices to get a reasonable approximation
to the Hessian operator norm. It is worth noting that thanks
to the hessian vector multiplication algorithm (Pearlmutter,
1994), computing the gradient enjoys a linear running time.
5. Experiments
In this section, we present some first experimental results
for evaluating the adversarial robustness of models trained
1When ‖Hθv‖q is differentiable as a function of v which is the
case for q = 2.
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Algorithm 1 Hessian Norm Regularization training
Input: Training data {(xi, yi)}Ni=1, a model f , initial-
ized parameters θ, number of epochs J , operator norm
optimization iterations T , hyper parameters λ1, λ2, and
learning rates o and l.
for j = 1 to J do
Sample a mini batch {(xi, yi)}bi=1 of size b.
Initialize vijs i.i.d. from N (0, I) defined on Rd, for
i ∈ 1, . . . , b and j ∈ 1, . . . ,K − 1.
for t = 1 to T do
Update vijs for each i and j using:
vij = vij + o ∗ ∇vij‖Hf(j)(xi)vij‖q
vij =
vij
‖vij‖p
end for
Update parameters θ by:
θ = θ +
b∑
i=1
K∑
j 6=yi
l ∗ ∇θ
(
`(xi, yi)
+ λ2‖∇f (j)(xi)‖q + λ1λ2‖Hf(j)(xi)vij‖q
)
end for
with the Cross-Ho¨lder regularizer. We test the robustness
on two datasets, namely MNIST and FMNIST. As baseline
defenses, we use the gradient based approach of Cross-
Lipschitz (Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017). We also com-
pare against adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017) as it
is considered state of the art defense (Athalye et al., 2018).
The detailed experimental setup and further results are pre-
sented in Appendix C.
Evaluating the robustness is a hard problem due to the high
non-convexity of the attack optimization problem (Madry
et al., 2017). Many defenses claim the robustness against
weak attacks while they fail to be robust against harder at-
tacks (Athalye et al., 2018; Carlini et al., 2019). Therefore,
to evaluate the robustness of models trained with a given
defense mechanism, it is important to use the strongest avail-
able attacks. We use the recommended PGD attack with
multiple iterations and multiple random initializations (Car-
lini et al., 2019). Since, in adversarial training, an attack is
used in the training procedure we use also a different attack
in the evaluation phase (Carlini et al., 2019). We use two
PGD attacks with 50 iterations and 10 random restarts. The
first one uses the cross-entropy loss as objective, as in adver-
sarial training. The second one uses the objective of Carlini
and Wagner (CW) (Carlini et al., 2019; Athalye et al., 2018).
As a robustness metric, we report on adversarial accuracy,
that is, the accuracy after we have applied a given attack.
We report the worst-case results of the two attacks, which is
the minimum adversarial accuracy of the two attacks. We re-
port the adversarial accuracy for different robustness levels
ε. Figure 1 depicts the worst-case accuracy of the three de-
fenses on the MNIST dataset. The figure shows that all three
defenses are quite effective up to robustness level 4.0 after
which Cross-Ho¨lder outperforms Cross-Lipschitz. Figure 2
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Figure 1. Adversarial accuracy versus robustness levels for MNIST
dataset.
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Figure 2. Adversarial accuracy versus robustness levels fashion
MNIST dataset.
shows the worst case adversarial accuracy on the FMNIST
dataset. Again Cross-Ho¨lder outperforms Cross-Lipschitz
but is inferior to adversarial training up to robustness level
4.0. Experiments on FMNIST showed the effectiveness of
Cross-Ho¨lder regularizer over Cross-Lipschitz while being
competitive with adversarial training.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we present a method for an input gradient reg-
ularization of neural networks, which we call Cross-Ho¨lder
regularization. We have proven both theoretically and em-
pirically that this regularization is useful for increasing the
resilience of deep neural networks against adversarial at-
tacks. In future work, we wish to analyze the proposed
regularization algorithm on further datasets.
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A. Related Work
Since the work of (Szegedy et al., 2013) and (Biggio et al.,
2013), neural network models have been shown to be vul-
nerable to small input perturbations. Many elaborate attacks
have been introduced since then (Carlini & Wagner, 2017;
Brendel et al., 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2015). As a
response, many defenses—training algorithms that harden
the attack problem—have also been devised (Madry et al.,
2017; Papernot et al., 2016; Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017).
In this section, we give a brief overview of the prominent
attacks and related defenses.
Attacks can be classified into black-box (Brendel et al.,
2017) and white-box (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) attacks. In
a white-box attack, the attacker has full knowledge of the
classifier used (e.g., the neural network architecture and its
parameters). On the other hand, black-box attacks can only
query a classifier but do not have the full knowledge of the
model. Both types of attacks have the same goal: they are
trying to solve the problem (Szegedy et al., 2013; Carlini &
Wagner, 2017):
min
δ
‖δ‖p s.t. C(x) 6= C(x+ δ), (7)
or alternatively (Madry et al., 2017; Goodfellow et al., 2014)
max
δ
`(x+ δ, y) s.t. ‖δ‖p ≤ . (8)
The adversarial attack problem is usually not convex due to
the constraint in the problem (7) and the objective of (8).
In Madry et al. (2017) the authors argue that projected gra-
dient descent (PGD) with multiple steps provides a good
solution to the problem. They showed that, when PGD is
run with different random restarts, the optimized objective
values seem to concentrate. They then concluded that PGD
does not get stuck in a bad local minimum. Therefore, they
advised using PGD with multiple steps to craft adversarial
examples and to evaluate the robustness of classifiers. The
authors of Carlini & Wagner (2017) attempt to solve the
problem (7) by a Lagrangian relaxation. They do not specify
a robustness level  constraint to the attack. However, they
minimize the distance of the crafted adversarial example
to the input while adding a margin like loss to derive the
constraint of (7) to be satisfied. A combination of the two
approaches was used by the authors of Athalye et al. (2018).
In it the authors used the PGD algorithm to solve a relaxed
objective of (7).
A more realistic setting for practical attacks is the black-box
setting (Papernot et al., 2017; Brendel et al., 2017), in which
the attacker can access the attacked model only through
queries. In Papernot et al. (2017) the authors proposed to
query the attacked model with random samples and use the
returned label to train a local replica model. They then craft
adversarial examples on the replica in a white-box fashion.
Those examples are then shown to transfer to the attacked
model, that is, they are also misclassified under the black-
box model. The authors of Brendel et al. (2017) proposed
a heuristic search for adversarial examples. Given an input
example, they generate a random example with a different
class. Starting from it, they sample a random direction to
move according to a proposal distribution. This distribution
is designed such that moving in its sampled directions, the
distance between the original and current point is reduced.
After each move, the new point is checked if it still has a
different class. If yes, the point is accepted, otherwise, it
is rejected and a new sample direction is sampled. After
a large number of iterations, they show that they could
craft adversarial samples that could fool industrial deployed
systems.
As more attacks are devised, many defense mechanisms
have been proposed. Defenses can be characterised into
data augmentation (Madry et al., 2017; Kannan et al., 2018),
regularization based (Bietti et al., 2018; Cisse´ et al., 2017)
and detection (Meng & Chen, 2017; Grosse et al., 2017).
Perhaps the most widely used defense mechanism is a data
augmentation method known as adversarial training (Madry
et al., 2017). In adversarial training one generates adversar-
ial examples using an attack and includes these examples in
the training set. It was proposed concurrently with the in-
troduction of adversarial examples in Szegedy et al. (2013).
The proposed attack method in Szegedy et al. (2013) was,
however, slow and hence not suitable as an inner loop in the
training procedures. A fast attack was proposed in Good-
fellow et al. (2014) to enhance adversarial training. It was,
however, later shown that such a fast method is inadequate
to promote real robustness (Trame`r et al., 2017) as authors
introduce the masking gradient phenomena. Masking gradi-
ent or more generally obfuscating gradients (Athalye et al.,
2018) is a term coined to describe the situation where a
defense causes the input gradient of a model to be non-
informative. This prevents weak attacks from altering ex-
ample label but stronger attacks like PGD would still be
successful (Athalye et al., 2018). When a strong attack
used in adversarial training, real robustness can be achieved
(Athalye et al., 2018; Madry et al., 2017). A theoretical
motivation to adversarial training was introduced in Madry
et al. (2017) where the authors viewed it as solving a robust
optimization problem
min
θ
E[ max
‖δ‖p≤
`(f(x+ δ), y)].
They then utilize Danskin’s theorem (Danskin, 2012) to ar-
gue that one can solve the inner maximization with PGD
and substitute solution δ∗ to solve the outer minimization.
This argument, however, requires the inner maximization
to be solved which can not be guaranteed due to the non-
concavity of the problem. Adversarial training with a PGD
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has withstood a lot of tests (Athalye et al., 2018) and is
therefore considered the state of the art. Different flavors of
adversarial training have also been proposed. For example
in Kannan et al. (2018), the authors proposed to use the
distance between the logits of clean and adversarial exam-
ples as a regularization term. Similarly, Zhang et al. (2019)
proposed to use a cross-entropy loss between the predicted
class probability of the model on a clean example and on
adversarial examples generated based on that clean example.
Another class of defenses is that of regularization based ap-
proaches. In this approach, one identifies a property of the
model and relates it to adversarial vulnerability and designs
a regularization term to reduce such a property. For exam-
ple, in Bietti et al. (2018); Cisse´ et al. (2017) the authors
proposed to regularize the Lipschitz constant of the predic-
tion model by reducing the operator norms of the weight
matrices. The norm of the input gradient has been proposed
to use as a regularizer to defend against adversarial exam-
ples (Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017; Ross & Doshi-Velez,
2018; Finlay & Oberman, 2019). Interestingly in Hein &
Andriushchenko (2017), the authors derived a principled ap-
proach to defense. They theoretically derived a relationship
between the norm of the adversarial noise and the maxi-
mum norm of the input gradient locally around an input
example. They then proposed to regularize the norm of the
gradient at the input point to promote robustness. Since the
regularizer is designed to derive the norm of the gradient
to be small at the input point and not the ball around it, it
might be less powerful as there is an implicit assumption
that the model is locally linear around the input. In our
work, we propose a second order approach which provides
a better local approximation of a model. We follow the
principled approach of Hein & Andriushchenko (2017) by
first deriving a relationship between adversarial robustness
and the maximum operator norm of the Hessian matrix in
a ball around an input example. Motivated by this result,
we propose a regularizer to derive the operator norm of the
Hessian to be small and thus promote robustness.
Related to our proposed method is the work of Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. (2019) and Singla & Feizi (2020). In
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2019), the authors experimentally
noticed that adversarial training reduces the curvature of
the loss function of neural networks, where they define cur-
vature as the maximum magnitude of Hessian eigenvalues.
They further proposed to regularize the curvature to induce
robustness to the trained models. They used two main ap-
proximations in their regularizer. First, they used a finite
difference method to compute a Hessian vector multipli-
cation and therefore their proposed regularizer is simply a
difference of gradients regularization. In our work, we used
an exact and efficient Hessian vector multiplication algo-
rithm (Pearlmutter, 1994). Second, the authors estimated
the Hessian operator norm by the norm of the Hessian mul-
tiplied by the gradient assuming that the gradient and the
vector associated with the largest eigenvalue of the Hessian
are almost parallel. We experimentally show that it is not
a tight lower bound on the operator norm of the Hessian.
Therefore, we use an optimization approach to estimate the
true operator norm of the Hessian. On the other hand Singla
& Feizi (2020) proposes a certificate, a computable lower
bound on the norm of adversarial noise, on adversarial ro-
bustness based on the curvature. They provided an upper
bound on the operator norm of the input Hessian of the
model and proposed to use it as a regularizer. The upper
bound however is independent of the input example and
therefore not tight for many inputs as we show in the experi-
ments section that the Hessian operator norm distribution
has a large tail on real inputs let alone pathological ones.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we give the proof of theorem 2. We restate
the theorem below and give its proof.
Theorem 3. Let x ∈ Rd and f : Rd → R2 be a binary-
classifier scoring function with continuously twice differ-
entiable components. Further let f0(x) > f1(x) and de-
fine f = f0 − f1. Hf : Rd → Rd×d denotes the Hes-
sian of f . For δ ∈ Rd and p, q such that 1p + 1q = 1, if
f1(x+ δ) > f0(x+ δ), then the following bound holds:
‖δ‖p ≥ max
R>0
min
{
R,
f(x)
‖∇f(x)‖q + R2KR(f, x)
}
,
where KR(f, x) = max‖γ‖p≤RK(f, x + γ), for
K(f, x) := ‖Hf (x)‖p→q .
Proof. By Taylor theorem with remainder (Tu, 2011) we
have,
f(x+δ) = f(x)+〈∇f(x), δ〉+
∫ 1
0
δTHf (x+tδ)δ(1−t)dt,
Given that f1(x+ δ) ≥ f0(x+ δ), we get f(x+ δ) ≤ 0 and
hence,
f(x) ≤ 〈−∇f(x), δ〉+
∫ 1
0
−δTHf (x+ tδ)δ(1− t)dt.
By applying Ho¨lder inequality, monotonicity of integration
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and the definition of the operator norm, we get,
f(x) ≤〈−∇f(x), δ〉+
∫ 1
0
−δTHf (x+ tδ)δ(1− t)dt
≤‖∇− f(x)‖q‖δ‖p
+
∫ 1
0
‖δ‖p ‖Hf (x+ tδ)δ‖q (1− t)dt
≤‖∇− f(x)‖q‖δ‖p
+
∫ 1
0
‖δ‖2p‖Hf (x+ tδ)‖p→q(1− t)dt
=‖∇f(x))‖q‖δ‖p
+ ‖δ‖p
∫ 1
0
‖Hf (x+ tδ)‖p→q‖δ‖p(1− t)dt.
For a fixed R > 0, assume that ‖δ‖p ≤ R, then by mono-
tonicity of integration we have,∫ 1
0
‖Hf (x+ tδ)‖p→q‖δ‖p(1− t)dt
≤
∫ 1
0
max
‖γ‖p≤R
‖Hf (x+ γ)‖p→q‖δ‖p(1− t)dt
= KR(f, x)R
∫ 1
0
(1− t)dt
=
R
2
KR(f, x).
Substituting in (9) we get,
f(x) ≤ ‖∇f(x)‖q‖δ‖p + ‖δ‖pR
2
KR(f, x)
≤ ‖δ‖p
(
‖∇f(x))‖q + R
2
KR(f, x)
)
.
Thus we have that
‖δ‖p ≥ f(x)‖∇f(x)‖q + R2KR(f, x)
.
Since we restricted ‖δ‖p to be at most R, the last bound is
only correct when the left-hand side is less than R. So we
restrict the lower bound to be at most R. That is,
‖δ‖p ≥ min
{
R,
f(x)
‖∇f(x)‖q + R2KR(f, x)
}
.
Maximizing of R we get,
‖δ‖p ≥ max
R>0
min
{
R,
f(x)
‖∇f(x))‖q + R2KR(f, x)
}
.
C. Experiments
In this section, we give a detailed experimental setup and
results. We begin by investigating the estimation of the
Hessian operator norm and compare this to the norm of the
Hessian multiplied by the gradient to the Hessian operator
norm. We then present experiments where we evaluate
adversarial robustness on both the MNIST and FMNIST
datasets using our adversarial defense versus gradient based
methods and adversarial training.
C.1. Hessian Operator Norm Estimation
In this experiment we investigate the Hessian operator norm
approximation presented in Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2019).
The authors propose to estimate the Hessian2 operator norm
with the norm of the Hessian multiplied by the gradient,
we denote this quantity by |Hg|. We compare this to the
true Hessian operator norm computed by gradient ascent
optimization that we denote by |Hv∗|. We train a convolu-
tion neural network with the architecture below on MNIST
dataset with no defense. Then for each data point on the
evaluation set we compute both |Hg| and |Hv∗| and plot the
histogram (see figure 3). Figure 3a shows that the histogram
of |Hv∗| is shifted to the right and has a heavier tail. There
is however a large overlap between the two histograms. We
then investigate whether this overlap correspond to |Hg| be-
ing a good estimate or not. Figure 3b depicts the histogram
of the difference |Hv∗| − |Hg| where we notice that it has
a mode at around 5 with a heavier right tail. Therefore, we
conclude that |Hg| is not a tight lower bound and hence it
is better to use the true operator norm for regularizing the
Hessian. On the other hand, we see from the heavy tail of
the histogram of |Hv∗| that any global bound on the Hessian
operator norm is not tight for most of the input examples
and therefore using it as regularizing term as in (Singla &
Feizi, 2020) is restrictive, especially when the true operator
norm can be efficiently used as in our approach.
C.2. Adversarial Robustness Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the adversarial robustness of
models trained with the Cross-Ho¨lder regularizer. We test
the robustness on two datasets, namely MNIST and FM-
NIST.
C.2.1. SETUP
As baseline defenses, we use the gradient based approach of
Cross-Lipschitz (Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017). We also
compare against adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017) as
it is considered state of the art defense (Athalye et al., 2018).
We used the same network architecture for both the MNIST
2The Hessian is computed on f (j)(x), where j is the index of
the second largest logit.
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and FMNIST datasets which is the same architecture used
in Carlini et al. (2017). It consists of 4 convolution layers
with 3× 3-sized filters and the respective filter maps sizes
of (32,32,64,64), followed by two fully connected layers
of size 200 connected to the logits layer with size 10. We
introduced two changes to the architecture to ensure that
it is twice differentiable. First, we replaced the ReLU
activation function with SWISH xσ(x) (Ramachandran
et al., 2017), where σ is the sigmoid function. Second,
max-pooling was replaced by strided convolution every
second convolutional layer.
Robustness Evaluation Evaluating the robustness is
a hard problem due to the high non-convexity of the attack
optimization problem (Madry et al., 2017). Many defenses
claim robustness against weak attacks while they fail to
be robust against harder attacks (Athalye et al., 2018;
Carlini et al., 2019). Therefore it is important to use the
strongest available attacks to evaluate the robustness of
models trained with a given defense mechanism. We use
the recommended PGD attack with multiple iterations and
multiple random initializations (Carlini et al., 2019). Since
in adversarial training an attack is used in the training
procedure it is recommended to use a different attack in
the evaluation phase (Carlini et al., 2019). Therefore we
use two iterative PGD attacks with 50 iterations and 10
random restarts. The first is using cross entropy loss as
objective, the same as adversarial training. The second is
using the Carlini and Wagner (CW) objective (Carlini et al.,
2019; Athalye et al., 2018). We also report the worst case
results of the two attacks, which is the minimum adversarial
accuracy of the two attacks. The robustness metric we
report is adversarial accuracy, the accuracy after we have
applied a given attack. We report adversarial accuracy for
different robustness levels.
Hyperparameters We implement three defenses that
depend on several hyperparameters. Adversarial training
has the parameter ε, the robustness level used for the
training attack. Cross-Ho¨lder has the parameters λ1 and λ2.
We choose the hyperparameters by leaving out 5% of the
data outside of the training set. We employ a grid search
to select the hyperparameter on the left out evaluation set.
The criteria to select the winning hyperparameter is for it
to achieve at least 99% accuracy on the clean evaluation
set in case of MNIST and 88% in the case of FMNIST. We
then select the hyperparameter by selecting the best sum of
adversarial accuracy on robustness levels 3.0 and 4.0. The
selected parameters for adversarial training were  = 5.0 on
MNIST and  = 4.0 on FMNIST. For Cross-Lipschitz, we
selected λ1 = 0.2 for MNIST and λ1 = 0.15 for FMNIST.
Finally for Cross-Ho¨lder, we select λ1 = 0.02, λ2 = 0.5
for MNIST and λ1 = 0.2, λ2 = 0.5 for FMNIST.
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Figure 3. Hessian operator norm estimation comparison.
Results Figure 1 shows the result of adversarial evaluation
on the MNIST dataset. Figure 4a shows the result of
applying the PGD attack with the cross entropy loss. The
figure shows that all three defenses are quite effective
up to robustness level 3.0 after which we see that both
Cross-Lipschitz and Cross-Ho¨lder accuracies decrease
with Cross-Lipschitz decreases faster. This was expected
as in adversarial training the same attack was used in
training. Figure 4b shows the results of applying PGD
with CW loss. On this attack Cross-Ho¨lder behaves better
than both adversarial training and Cross-Lipschitz after
robustness level 4.0. Figure 5 shows the result of the
worst case attack which again shows that Cross-Ho¨lder
outperforms both Cross-Lipschitz and adversarial training
after robustness level 4.0. On MNIST, our experiments
suggest that Cross-Ho¨lder regularizer outperforms both
Cross-Lipschitz and adversarial training.
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(a) PGD on cross entropy loss.
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(b) PGD on CW loss.
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(c) Worst case attack.
Figure 4. Adversarial accuracy versus robustness levels for MNIST
dataset.
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(a) PGD on cross entropy loss.
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(b) PGD on CW loss.
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Figure 5. Adversarial accuracy versus robustness levels fashion
MNIST dataset.
